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Abstract
We define necessary and sufficient conditions on prices and incomes under which
quantity choices can violate SARP (Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference) but not
WARP (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference). As SARP extends WARP by ad-
ditionally imposing transitivity on the revealed preference relation, this effectively
defines the conditions under which transitivity adds bite to the empirical analysis.
For finite datasets, our characterization takes the form of a triangular condition
that must hold for all three-element subsets of normalized prices, and which is easy
to verify in practice. For infinite datasets, we formally establish an intuitive con-
nection between our characterization and the concept of Hicksian aggregation. We
demonstrate the practical use of our conditions through two empirical illustrations.
JEL Classification: C14, DO1, D11, D12.
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1 Introduction
For demand behavior under linear budget constraints, it is well established that the
Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) implies the Strong Axiom of Revealed
Preference (SARP) as long as there are no more than two goods.1 Rose (1958) provided
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1Samuelson (1938) originally introduced the WARP as a basic consistency requirement on consump-
tion behavior: if a consumer chooses a first bundle over a second one in a particular choice situation
(characterized by a linear budget constraint), then (s)he cannot choose this second bundle over the first
one in a different choice situation. Houthakker (1950) defined SARP as the extension of WARP with a
transitive RP relation. See Chambers and Echenique (2016) for more discussion about WARP, SARP
and other revealed preference axioms such as (Weak) GARP (which we will consider in Section 6).
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a first formal statement of this fact. As SARP extends WARP by (only) imposing the
additional requirement that the revealed preference (RP) relation must be transitive,
this effectively implies that transitivity itself does not add bite to the empirical revealed
preference analysis.2
This equivalence between WARP and SARP has an intuitive analogue in terms of
testable properties of Slutsky matrices, which are typically studied in differential analysis
of continuous demand. Specifically, Slutsky symmetry is always satisfied by construction
in situations with two goods and, thus, only negative semi-definiteness of the Slutsky
matrix can be tested empirically in such instances. This directly complies with the two
classic results of Samuelson (1938) and Houthakker (1950): Samuelson showed that de-
mand is consistent with WARP only if compensated demand effects are negative, whereas
Houthakker showed that a consumer behaves consistent with utility maximization (im-
plying Slutsky symmetry in addition to Slutsky negativity) if and only if demand is
consistent with SARP.3 In a two-goods setting, the equivalence between WARP and
SARP translates into non-testability of Slutsky symmetry (in contrast to negativity).
Contribution. We can conclude that the (lack of) empirical content of transitivity
of the RP relation with two goods is well understood by now. However, the question
remains under which conditions WARP implies SARP when there are more than two
goods. In this respect, an intuitive starting point relates to the possibility of dimension-
reduction that is based on Hicksian aggregation.4 A set of goods can be represented by
a Hicksian aggregate if the goods’ relative prices remain fixed over decision situations.
Thus, by verifying the empirical validity of constant relative prices, we can check whether
the demand for multiple goods can be studied in terms of two Hicksian aggregates. If
this happens to be the case, it immediately follows from Rose (1958)’s result that WARP
and SARP will be empirically equivalent.
Clearly, the condition of constant relative prices will not be met in most real life
settings, which provides the core motivation for our current study. Specifically, we es-
tablish the empirical conditions on prices and incomes that characterize the empirical
bite of transitivity of the RP relation in a general situation with multiple goods. These
conditions are necessary and sufficient for WARP and SARP to be equivalent. In other
words, if (and only if) the conditions are met, then dropping the transitivity condition
will lead to exactly the same empirical conclusions. The fact that our conditions are
defined in terms of budget sets, without requiring quantity information, is particularly
convenient from a practical point of view. It makes it possible to check on the basis of
given prices and incomes whether it suffices to (only) check WARP (instead of SARP)
to verify consistency with utility maximization. Conversely, it characterizes the budget
conditions under which transitivity restrictions can potentially add value to the empirical
analysis.
Interestingly, we can show that our general characterization generates Rose (1958)’s
conclusion in the specific instance with two goods. Furthermore, we can establish an
intuitive relation between our characterization and the Hicksian aggregation argument
that we gave above. Specifically, when applying our characterization result to a con-
2See Quah (2006) for more discussion on rationalizalibity in terms of non-transitive preferences.
3See also Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell, and Sonnenschein (1976) for related discussion.
4See, for example, Varian (1992) for a general discussion on Hicksian aggregation. Lewbel (1996)
presents related results on commodity aggregation under specific assumptions.
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tinuous setting (with infinitely many price-income regimes), we obtain a condition that
basically states that all prices must lie in a common two-dimensional plane. We show
that this is formally equivalent to a setting where goods can be linearly aggregated into
two composite commodities, which we can interpret as two Hicksian aggregates. As an
implication, this also establishes that (in a continuous setting) Slutsky negativity entails
symmetry if and only if prices satisfy this particular type of Hicksian aggregation.
Relation with the literature. The question whether, and under what conditions,
WARP and SARP are empirically distinguishable has attracted considerable attention
in the theoretical literature. Shortly after Rose (1958)’s result on the equivalence between
WARP and SARP for two goods, Gale (1960) constructed a counterexample showing that
WARP and SARP may differ in settings with more than two goods. Since then, various
authors have presented further clarifications and extensions of Gale’s basic result (see,
e.g., Shafer (1977); Peters and Wakker (1994); Heufer (2014)). In a similar vein, Uzawa
(1960) showed that, if a demand function satisfies WARP together with some regular-
ity condition, then it also satisfies SARP. However, Bossert (1993) put this result into
perspective by demonstrating that, for continuous demand functions, Uzawa’s regularity
condition alone already implies SARP.
A main difference with our current contribution is that these previous studies typi-
cally exemplified the distinction between WARP and SARP by constructing hypothetical
‘demand’ functions (i.e. functions of prices and income) or datasets (containing prices,
incomes and consumption quantities) that satisfy WARP but violate SARP. Such func-
tions or datasets, however, might never be encountered in reality. In this sense, it leaves
open the question whether the possibility to distinguish SARP from WARP is merely
a theoretical curiosity or also an empirical regularity. Moreover, the datasets that are
constructed do not define general conditions on budget sets (i.e. prices and incomes,
without quantities) under which SARP and WARP are empirically equivalent.
Finally, the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference is closely related to the so-called
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). As shown by Afriat (1967), GARP
gives necessary and sufficient conditions on a finite dataset for consistency with utility
maximizing behavior.5 In contrast to SARP, GARP allows for consumers with flat in-
difference curves. As a variation on Rose (1958)’s result, Banerjee and Murphy (2006)
showed that, in a two-goods setting, the pairwise version of GARP, which they call the
Weak Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (WGARP), is equivalent to GARP.
We will show that, when restricting consumption quantities to be strictly positive, the
conditions on prices and budgets that equate SARP with WARP are also necessary and
sufficient for GARP to be equivalent to WGARP.
Outline. The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 first introduces
some notation and basic definitions, and subsequently presents our main result. Section
3 provides some further discussion of this main result. Section 4 shows the connection
between our characterization and Hicksian aggregation when the set of possible budgets
becomes infinite. Section 5 shows the practical use of our theoretical findings through
two empirical illustrations. Section 6 extends our SARP- and WARP-based results to
(W)GARP. The Appendix contains the proofs of our main results.
5The term GARP was introduced by Varian (1982) as an alternative name for the Cyclical Consistency
condition of Afriat (1967).
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2 When WARP equals SARP
Notation and terminology. We consider a setting where we observe n budget sets for
m goods. This defines an original dataset {(pˆt, xˆt)}t=1,...,n with price (row) vectors pˆt ∈
Rm++ and expenditure levels xˆt ∈ R++. To facilitate our further discussion, and to simplify
the notation, we summarize the budgets (pˆt, xˆt) in terms of normalized price vectors
pt = (pˆt/xˆt), which divide each observed price vector pˆt by the associated expenditure
level xˆt. By construction, these normalized prices pt correspond to an expenditure level
xt = 1 for all observations t. Using this, we can summarize all the relevant information
on the observed budgets by the dataset P = {pt}t=1,...,n containing the normalized price
vectors.
Let {qt}t=1,...,n be a collection of quantity (column) vectors on the budget lines defined
by the normalized price vectors in P = {pt}t=1,...,n. In other words, for all observations
t = 1, . . . , n, qt ∈ Rm+ and ptqt = 1. We denote by Q(P ) the collection of all such
quantity vectors, i.e. for P = {pt}t=1,...,n we set
Q(P ) = {{qt}t=1,...,n : qt ∈ Rm+ ,ptqt = 1}.
Q(P ) gives us all possible consumption vectors that a consumer may choose when con-
fronted with the normalized price vectors in P . We can now define the basic revealed
preference concepts.
Definition 1. Let P = {pt}t=1,...,n be a set of normalized price vectors and {qt}t=1,...,n ∈
Q(P ). Then, for all t, v ≤ n, the quantity vector qt is revealed preferred to the bundle
qv if ptqt(= 1) ≥ ptqv. We denote this as qtRqv.
In words, qt is revealed preferred to qv if qv was cheaper than qt at the normalized
prices observed at t. Then, we have the following definitions of WARP and SARP.
Definition 2. Let P = {pt}t=1,...,n be a set of normalized price vectors and {qt}t=1,...,n ∈
Q(P ). Then, {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,n violates WARP if R has a cycle of length 2, i.e.
qtRqv Rqt,
for some observation t, v and qt 6= qv.
Definition 3. Let P = {pt}t=1,...,n be a set of normalized price vectors and {qt}t=1,...,n ∈
Q(P ). Then, {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,n violates SARP if R has a cycle, i.e.
qtRqv Rqs . . . Rqk Rqt,
for some sequence of observations t, v, s, . . . , k and not all bundles qt, . . . ,qk are identical.
It is clear from the definitions that SARP consistency implies WARP consistency,
i.e. if {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,n violates WARP, then it also violates SARP. We are interested in
the reverse relationship: under which conditions does a violation of SARP also imply a
violation of WARP. Given this specific research question, we consider settings in which
the empirical analyst does not necessarily observe the quantity choices, but only the
normalized price vectors P = {pt}t=1,...,n. In other words, what are the conditions on the
normalized price vectors in P such that, for all possible quantity vectors {qt}t=1,...,n ∈
Q(P ), WARP is equivalent to SARP for all subsets of {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,n. To this end, we
use the following definition.
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Definition 4. A set of normalized price vectors P = {pt}t=1,...,n is said to be WARP-
reducible if, for any set of quantity vectors {qt}t=1,...,n ∈ Q(P ), a subset of {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,n
violates SARP only if it also violates WARP.
Main result. To set the stage, we first repeat Rose (1958)’s original result, which says
that WARP is always equivalent to SARP if the number of goods equals two (i.e. m = 2).
Recently, Chambers and Echenique (2016) presented an insightful geometric proof of
Rose’s result. We phrase this result in terms of the terminology that we introduced
above.
Proposition 1. If there are only two goods (i.e. m = 2), then any set of normalized
price vectors P = {pt}t=1,...,n is WARP-reducible.
Our main result will provide a generalization of Proposition 1. It makes use of the
concept of a triangular configuration.
Definition 5. A set of normalized price vectors P = {pt}t=1,...,n is a triangular con-
figuration if, for any three normalized price vectors pt,pv and pk in P , there exists
a number λ ∈ [0, 1] and a permutation σ : {t, v, k} → {t, v, k} such that the following
condition holds:
pσ(t) ≤ λpσ(v) + (1− λ)pσ(k), or pσ(t) ≥ λpσ(v) + (1− λ)pσ(k).
We note that the inequalities in this definition are vector inequalities. As such,
Definition 5 states that, for any price three vectors, we need that there is a convex
combination of two of the three price vectors that is either smaller or larger than the third
price vector. Checking whether a set of price vectors is a triangular configuration merely
requires verifying the linear inequalities in Definition 5 for any possible combination
of three price vectors. Clearly, this is easy to do in practice, even if the number of
observations (i.e. n) gets large. In particular, given that there are only n(n− 1)(n− 2)/6
possible combinations of price vectors that need to be considered, the triangular condition
in Definition 5 can be checked in polynomial (O(n3)) time.
At this point, we want to emphasize once more that in practical applications the
triangular condition in Definition 5 will involve both observed prices and observed ex-
penditures. As explained above, we work with normalized price vectors pt = (pˆt/xˆt) for
some given dataset {(pˆt, xˆt)}t=1,...,n. Thus, in terms of the original data we can rephrase
the inequalities in Definition 5 as
pˆσ(t)
xˆσ(t)
≤ λ pˆσ(v)
xˆσ(v)
+ (1− λ) pˆσ(k)
xˆσ(k)
, or
pˆσ(t)
xˆσ(t)
≥ λ pˆσ(v)
xˆσ(v)
+ (1− λ) pˆσ(k)
xˆσ(k)
.
We can show that the triangular condition in Definition 5 is necessary and sufficient
for WARP and SARP to be equivalent.
Proposition 2. A set of normalized price vectors P = {pt}t=1,...,n is WARP-reducible if
and only if it is a triangular configuration.
It is instructive to briefly sketch the main steps of the proof of this result (full proof
in the Appendix). For the necessity part, we assume three price price vectors {p1,p2,p3}
that do not satisfy the triangular condition. An application of Farkas’ Lemma (Theorem
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of the Alternative) then establishes the existence of three quantity vectors {q1,q2,q3} ∈
Q({p1,p2,p3}) such that {(p1,q1), (p2,q2), (p3,q3)} satisfies WARP and violates SARP.
Next, we prove the sufficiency part by contradiction. In particular, we assume that
P is a triangular configuration but not WARP-reducible. This implies that there exist
quantity vectors {qt}t=1,...,n ∈ Q(P ) such that a subset of {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,n violates SARP
but not WARP. Without loss of generality, we let this subset be {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,J (J ≤ n)
and we assume it is minimal (i.e. does not contain another subset violating SARP). In
other words, we have a minimal revealed preference cycle
q1Rq2R . . . RqJ Rq1.
Subsequently, we consider for any j ≤ J the six possible cases for the triangular
inequalities that involve pj,pj+1 and pj+2 (i.e. three consecutive elements in the SARP
cycle). For each of these six cases, we can show that satisfying the associated triangular
inequality in Definition 5 leads to a contradiction. To do so, we exploit either that the
length of the SARP cycle is minimal or that WARP is satisfied.
3 Further discussion
To further interpret our characterization in Proposition 2, we clarify the specific relation-
ship between our main result and Rose (1958)’s original result. Subsequently, we sharpen
the intuition of our triangular condition through a specific example with three normal-
ized price vectors. Finally, we discuss the possibility of using our triangular condition to
bound the length of (potential) SARP cycles.
It is fairly easy to verify Proposition 2 generalizes Rose’s result in Proposition 1. In
particular, it suffices to show that, if the number of goods is equal to two, then any set
of price vectors is a triangular configuration. To see this, consider three normalized price
vectors {p1,p2,p3} for two goods (i.e. m = 2). Obviously, if p1 ≥ p2 or p2 ≥ p1, we have
that {p1,p2,p3} is a triangular configuration. Let us then consider the more interesting
case where p1 and p2 are not ordered, which we illustrate in Figure 1.
The price vector p3 should then fall into one of the six regions, which are numbered
I to VI. For any of these six possible scenarios, the triangular condition in Definition 5 is
met. To show this, we first consider the case where p3 lies in region I. In that case, p3 is
obviously larger than a convex combination of p1 and p2. Similarly, if p3 lies in region
II, it is smaller than a convex combination of p1 and p2. Next, if p3 lies in region III,
then p1 is smaller than a convex combination of p2 and p3 and, conversely, p1 is larger
than a convex combination of p2 and p3 if p3 lies in region IV. Finally, if p3 lies in region
V, there is a convex combination of p1 and p3 that dominates p2 and, if p3 lies in region
VI, then p2 is larger than a convex combination of p1 and p3. We can thus conclude
that any possible set of price vectors {p1,p2,p3} is WARP-reducible.
The following Example 1 provides some further intuition for the result in Proposition
2. In this example, we focus on cycles of length 3, and show that the triangular configu-
ration implies that each SARP violation of length 3 must contain a WARP violation.
Example 1. Consider a set of three normalized price vectors P = {p1,p2,p3} that is
a triangular configuration. Without loss of generality, we may assume that one of the
following two inequalities holds: p1 ≤ λp2 + (1− λ)p3 or p1 ≥ λp2 + (1− λ)p3 for some
λ ∈ [0, 1].
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Figure 1: The triangular condition in a two goods setting
price 2
price 1
p1
p2
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
Let us first consider p1 ≤ λp2 +(1−λ)p3. Assume that there exists a SARP violation
with a cycle of length 3. With three observations, there are only two possibilities for cycles
of length 3: q1Rq2Rq3Rq1 or q1Rq3Rq2Rq1. If q1Rq2Rq3Rq1, then it must be
that
1 = p2q2 ≥ p2q3 and 1 = p3q3.
Together with our triangular inequality this implies that
1 ≥ (λp2 + (1− λ)p3)q3 ≥ p1q3.
As such, we can conclude that q1Rq3, which gives q1Rq3Rq1, i.e. a violation of WARP.
A similar reasoning holds for the second possibility (i.e. q1Rq3Rq2Rq1), which shows
that in this first case each violation of SARP implies a WARP violation.
For the second case, p1 ≥ λp2 + (1 − λ)p3, we must consider the same two possible
SARP violations. The reasoning is now slightly different. In particular, let us assume that
there is no violation of WARP. For the SARP violation q1Rq2Rq3Rq1 this requires
1 < p3q2 (i.e. not q3Rq2 ). Since 1 = p2q2, we obtain that, if λ < 1,
1 < (λp2 + (1− λ)p3)q2 ≤ p1q2.
This clearly contradicts q1Rq2 (i.e. 1 ≥ p1q2). If λ = 1, we have p1 ≥ p2 and thus
1 = p1q1 ≥ p2q1.
This again yields a contradiction, as it implies the WARP violation q1Rq2Rq1. A
similar reasoning holds for the second possibility (i.e. q1Rq3Rq2Rq1), which shows
that also for this case any SARP violation implies a WARP violation.
Finally, an obvious question pertains to the possibility of using our characterization
in Proposition 2 to bound the length of (potential) SARP cycles.6 In particular, assume
6We thank Mark Dean for pointing this question out to us.
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that we have a set of n normalized price vectors that form a triangular configuration,
and suppose that we add a n + 1-th price vector such that the extended set of prices is
no longer a triangular configuration. Is it possible to bound the length of the (potential)
SARP cycles for this extended set of normalized prices?
In Appendix B, we show that the answer to this question is negative: the extended
price set can imply a SARP cycle of maximal length (i.e. all observations are involved).
We obtain this conclusion in three steps. In the first step, we construct a set of n
normalized price vectors (p1, ...,pn) that is a triangular configuration and, therefore,
WARP-reducible. In the second step, we construct a corresponding set of n quantity
vectors (q1, ...,qn) to define a dataset {pt,qt}t=1,...,n for which we characterize the asso-
ciated revealed preference relations. In the third and final step, we introduce a (n+1)-th
price vector (p0) and a corresponding (n+1)-th quantity vector (q0) that obtains a SARP
cycle of length n+1 for the dataset {pt,qt}t=0,...,n, without there being any smaller SARP
cycle. At a general level, this leads us to conclude that, for a set of n price vectors that
is WARP-reducible, it is possible to add a (n + 1)-th price vector that obtains a SARP
cycle of any length.
4 Connection with Hicksian aggregation
So far we have assumed a finite dataset with n normalized price vectors (i.e. budget sets).
This corresponds to a typical situation in empirical demand analysis, when the empirical
analyst can only use a finite number of observations. In this section, we consider the
theoretical situation with a continuum of (normalized) price vectors. This will establish
a formal connection between our triangular condition and the notion of Hicksian aggre-
gation. Specifically, we will show that, when the set of price vectors becomes infinite,
our conditions leads to the requirement that the demand for multiple (i.e. m) goods
can be summarized in terms of two Hicksian aggregates. In a sense, it establishes our
characterization in Proposition 2 as a finite sample version of the Hicksian aggregation
requirement for WARP to be equivalent to SARP.
To formalize the argument, we assume that the infinite set of normalized price vectors
P is a cone, that is, for all vectors p ∈ P and all γ > 0, γp ∈ P . We remark that, because
we focus on normalized price vectors (with total expenditures equal to unity), the price
vector γp equivalently corresponds to a situation with (non-normalized) price vector p
and total expenditures 1/γ. In other words, our condition on the set P actually allows us
to consider any possible expenditure level for a given specification of (non-normalized)
price vectors. Likewise, it gives the set of possible normalized price vectors when we
do not have any prior information on the total expenditure level. We can derive the
following result.
Proposition 3. Let the set of normalized price vectors P be a cone. Define the m − 1
dimensional simplex ∆ = {p ∈ Rm++|
∑m
i=1(p)i = 1}.7 If P ∩∆ is closed, then any three
price vectors of P satisfy the triangular condition if and only if there exist two vectors
r1, r2 ∈ P such that for all p ∈ P , p is a linear combination of r1 and r2. In particular,
there are numbers α, β ∈ R+ not both zero such that,
p = αr1 + βr2.
7For (p)i representing the i-th component of p (i.e. the price of good i).
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Basically, this result requires that all price vectors p ∈ P must lie in a common
two-dimensional plane. The additional requirement that P ∩ ∆ is closed is a technical
condition guaranteeing that r1 and r2 belong to P .
Interestingly, Proposition 3 allows us to interpret our triangular condition (under
infinitely many prices) in terms of Hicksian quantity aggregation. Specifically, Hicksian
aggregation requires that all prices in a subset of goods change proportionally to some
common price vector (i.e. p = αr for all t, with r ∈ Rm+ and scalar α > 0). In our
case, we can, for any bundle qt, construct a new “quantity vector” zt of two goods where
(zt)1 = r1qt and (zt)2 = r2qt. Correspondingly, we can construct new “price vectors”
wt = [αt, βt]. Then, for any two observations t and v, we have
1 ≥ ptqv = (αtr1 + βtr2)qv = αtr1qv + βtr2qv = wtzv.
In other words, we obtain qtRqv for the set of quantity vectors {qt}t=1,...,n ∈ Q(P ) if
and only if ztRzv for the set of quantity vectors {zt}t=1,...,n. This implies that {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,n
will violate SARP (resp. WARP) if and only if the dataset {(wt, zt)}t=1,...,n violates
SARP (resp. WARP). Moreover, the dataset {(wt, zt)}t=1,...,n only contain two goods,
so Proposition 1 implies that WARP is equivalent to SARP, and this equivalence carries
over to the set of {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,n. Basically, this defines the possibility to construct two
Hicksian aggregates as a necessary and sufficient condition for WARP to be equivalent
to SARP when there are infinitely many price vectors.
By building further on this intuition, we can also directly interpret Proposition 3
in terms of utility maximizing behavior. To see this, we start by considering a ratio-
nal (i.e. SARP-consistent) individual with indirect utility function v(p), which defines
the maximal attainable utility given the normalized price vector p. By construction,
this function v(p) is quasi-convex, decreasing and satisfies Roy’s identity, i.e. the m-
dimensional demand functions are given by q = ∇pv(p)/(p∇pv(p)). By using our above
notation, if the Hicksian aggregation property in Proposition 3 is satisfied, we can write
v(p) = v(αr1 +βr2) ≡ v˜(α, β) = v˜(w). It is easy to verify that also v˜(w) is quasi-convex,
decreasing and satisfies Roy’s identity, which in this case states that the two-dimensional
demand functions satisfy z = ∇wv˜(w)/(w∇wv˜(w)).
5 Empirical illustrations
To show the practical relevance of our triangular condition, we present empirical appli-
cations that make use of two different types of household datasets that have been the
subject of empirical revealed preference analysis in recent studies. They will illustrate
alternative possible uses of our characterization in Proposition 2.
Panel data. Our first application considers household data that are drawn from the
Spanish survey ECPF (Encuesta Continua de Presupestos Familiares), which has been
used in various SARP-based empirical analyses.8 In what follows, we will specifically
focus on the dataset that was studied by Beatty and Crawford (2011). This dataset
contains a time-series of 8 observations for 1585 households, on 15 nondurable goods.
8See, for example, Crawford (2010), Beatty and Crawford (2011), Demuynck and Verriest (2013),
Adams, Cherchye, De Rock, and Verriest (2014) and Cherchye, Demuynck, De Rock, and Hjertstrand
(2015).
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Importantly, different households can be characterized by other price regimes, which
makes that the empirical content of our triangular condition will vary over households.
We begin by verifying whether the household-specific price series satisfy the conditions
for two-dimensional Hicksian aggregation as we defined them in Section 4 (Proposition
3). As discussed before, these conditions are sufficient (but not necessary) for WARP to
be equivalent to SARP in the case of infinite datasets. It turns out that none of the 1585
household datasets satisfies the conditions. This shows that the Hicksian aggregation
criteria are very stringent from an empirical point of view. More generally, it suggests
that, for finite datasets, there is little hope that Hicksian aggregation arguments will
provide an effective basis to justify a WARP-based empirical analysis instead of a SARP-
based analysis.
By contrast, if we check the triangular condition in Definition 5, we conclude that
no less than 69.34% of the datasets satisfies these requirements. For these datasets, a
WARP-based analysis is equally informative as a SARP-based analysis. In view of the
computational burden associated with the transitivity requirement that is captured by
SARP, we see this as quite a comforting conclusion from a practical point of view. It also
indicates that the (necessary and sufficient) triangular condition provides a substantially
more useful basis than the (sufficient) Hicksian aggregation conditions to empirically
support a WARP-based analysis. Even though the two types of conditions converge
for infinitely large datasets, their empirical implications for finite datasets can differ
considerably.
Repeated cross-sectional data. Our second application uses the data from the
British Family Expenditure Survey (FES) that have been analyzed by Blundell et al.
(2003, 2008, 2015). These authors developed methods to combine Engel curves with
revealed preference axioms to obtain tight bounds on cost of living indices and demand
responses. These methods become substantially more elaborate when considering SARP
instead of WARP. This makes it directly relevant to check whether WARP and SARP
are equivalent for the budget sets taken up in the analysis.9
More specifically, the dataset is a repeated cross-section that contains 25 yearly obser-
vations (1975 to 1999) for three product categories (food, other nondurables and services).
As in the original studies, we focus on mean income for each observation year. When
checking our triangular condition for all triples of (normalized) price vectors, we conclude
that 2.39% of these triples violate these conditions. This indicates that WARP and SARP
are not fully equivalent for these data. However, for a fraction as low as 2.39%, it is also
fair to conclude that the subset of price vectors that may induce differences between
WARP and SARP is quite small.
9In this respect, Kitamura and Stoye (2013) use the same FES data in their application of so-called
“stochastic” axioms of revealed preference, which form the population analogues of the more standard
revealed preference axioms such as WARP and SARP (see McFadden (2005) for an overview). In a
stochastic revealed preference setting, the verification of WARP is relatively easy from a computational
point of view (see, for example, Hoderlein and Stoye (2014) and Cosaert and Demuynck (2017)), while
the verification of SARP is known to be difficult (i.e. NP-hard). As a direct implication, the knowledge
that WARP is empirically equivalent to SARP can have a huge impact on the computation time.
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6 When WGARP equals GARP
As a final step of our analysis, we extend our SARP-based result in Proposition 2 to
apply to the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). GARP generalizes
SARP by allowing for linear parts in the indifference curves of the consumer, i.e. multi-
valued demand correspondences. In this GARP-based setting, we will use the following
modifications of Definitions 1-4.
Definition 6. Let P = {pt}t=1,...,n be a set of normalized prices and {qt}t=1,...,n ∈ Q(P ).
Then, for all t, v ≤ n, the quantity vector qt is strictly revealed preferred to the
bundle qv if ptqt(= 1) > ptqv. We denote this as qtPRqv.
Definition 7. Let P = {pt}t=1,...,n be a set of normalized price vectors and {qt}t=1,...,n ∈
Q(P ). Then, {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,n violates WGARP if there are observations t, v ≤ n such
that qt PR qv Rqt.
Definition 8. Let P = {pt}t=1,...,n be a set of normalized price vectors and let {qt}t=1,...,n ∈
Q(P ). Then, {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,n violates GARP if there is a revealed preference cycle with
at least one strict revealed preference comparison, i.e.
qt PR qv Rqs . . . Rqk Rqt,
for some sequence of observations t, v, s, . . . , k.
Definition 9. A set of normalized price vectors P = {pt}t=1,...,n is said to be WGARP-
reducible if, for any set of quantity vectors {qt}t=1,...,n ∈ Q(P ) and qt  0 for all t, if
a subset of {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,n violates GARP, then the same subset also violates WGARP.
In this last Definition 9, the restriction qt  0 imposes that every element in the
quantity vector qt should be strictly positive, i.e. all goods should be consumed with
strictly positive amounts. We will clarify the relevance for this additional constraint after
presenting our main result in Proposition 5.
Before stating Proposition 5, we recapture the result of Banerjee and Murphy (2006),
which provided the GARP-based extension of Proposition 1 derived by Rose (1958).
Proposition 4. If there are only two goods (i.e. m = 2), then any set of normalized
price vectors P = {pt}t=1,...,n is WGARP-reducible.
When using the concept of triangular configuration in Definition 5, we can derive the
following generalization of Banerjee and Murphy’s result.
Proposition 5. A set of normalized price vectors P = {pt}t=1,...,n is WGARP-reducible
if and only if it is a triangular configuration.
At this point, it is worth remarking that the requirement qt  0 in Definition 9 is
crucial for this result to hold. We show this by means of Example 2, which presents a
set of three normalized prices that is a triangular configuration. For these prices, we can
define quantity bundles with zero entries that satisfy WGARP but not GARP.10
10We note that the fact that we have three goods is crucial for the construction in Example 2. Such
a construction is not possible if there are only two goods.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the counterexample
good 1
good 3
good 2
q1
q3
q2
Budget 1 is the solid hyperplane. Budget 2 is the dashed hyperplane. Budget 3 is the dotted
hyperplane.
Example 2. Consider the following set of three normalized price vectors, which is pre-
sented graphically in Figure 2:
p1 =
 11
1/2
 ,p2 =
21
1
 ,p3 =
11
1
 .
Because p1,p3 ≤ p2, we easily obtain that the triangular condition is satisfied. How-
ever, if we allow for zero quantities, we can construct quantity bundles that violate GARP
but not WGARP for the given prices. For example, this applies to
q1 =
10
0
 ,q2 =
 01/2
1/2
 ,q3 =
01
0
 .
These quantities imply a GARP violation because q1 PR q2Rq3Rq1. However, 1 <
p2q1 = 2, so {(p1,q1), (p2,q2)} does not form a WGARP cycle.
Thus, we conclude that the triangular condition does not characterize the sets of
normalized price vectors that are WGARP-reducible without the restriction that qt  0
for all t. From a technical perspective, the requirement q  0 allows us to go from
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a strict vector inequality p > p˜ to the inequality pq > p˜q. By contrast, when q can
contain zero entries, we may well have p > p˜ and pq = p˜q.
When allowing for zero quantities, it is possible to define a sufficient (but not always
necessary) condition for WGARP-reducibility that may be interpreted as a “strict” ver-
sion of the triangular condition in Definition 9. In particular, we can use the following
concept.
Definition 10. A set of normalized price vectors P = {pt}t=1,...,n is a strict triangular
configuration if, for any three normalized price vectors pt,pv and pk in P , there exists
a number λ ∈ [0, 1] and a permutation σ : {t, v, k} → {t, v, k} such that the following
condition holds:
pσ(t)  λpσ(v) + (1− λ)pσ(k), or pσ(t)  λpσ(v) + (1− λ)pσ(k).
Essentially, this definition replaces the weak inequalities ≤,≥ in Definition 5 by the
strict element-wise inequalities ,. A simple adaptation of the sufficiency part of our
proof of Proposition 2 then obtains the following result.11
Corollary 1. If a set of normalized price vectors P = {pt}t=1,...,n satisfies the strict
triangular condition, then it is WGARP-reducible even if we allow for zero entries of the
quantity vectors in Definition 9.
Some remarks are in order. First, in practice there will be almost no finite dataset that
satisfies the triangular condition in Definition 5 but not the strict triangular condition in
Definition 10. In other words, the empirical content of the two conditions will coincide
in most real life settings. Next, we note that in a two-goods setting the strict triangular
configuration will be violated only if the three normalized price vectors are co-linear, i.e.
one of the normalized price vectors is a convex combination of the other two.
Finally, Reny (2015) has recently shown that any finite or infinite dataset can be
rationalized by a utility function if and only if the dataset satisfies GARP.12 Given
this, our triangular condition makes sense even in non-finite settings: for any finite or
infinite dataset (with strictly positive consumption bundles), if the triangular condition
in Definition 5 is satisfied, then the dataset can be rationalized by a utility function if
and only if WGARP is satisfied.13
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Sufficiency. Consider a set of price vectors P = {pt}t=1,...,n that is a triangular
configuration. Towards a contradiction, assume that P is not WARP-reducible. This
means that there exists a set of quantity vectors {qt}t=1,...,n ∈ Q(P ) and a subset of
{(pt,qt)}t=1,...,n such that SARP is violated but WARP is satisfied.
11Intuitively, this result builds on the fact that, for any non-zero vector q ≥ 0, we have pq > p˜q when
p  p˜, so that strict (price) vector inequalities translate into strict (price × quantity) vector product
inequalities.
12Rationalization by a utility function means that there exists a utility function u : Rm → R such that
for every observation (pt,qt), ptq ≤ ptqt implies u(q) ≤ u(qt) and ptq < ptqt implies u(q) < u(qt).
13We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
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Let {(pt,qt)}t∈J (J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}) be such a subset that is minimal with respect to
set inclusion (such set exists by the fact that n is finite). Although the set J is not
necessarily unique, this minimality property implies that (i) {(pt,qt)}t∈J cannot have a
smaller subset that also violates SARP, (ii) all elements in {(pt,qt)}t∈J must be involved
in the SARP cycle and (iii) all vectors in {qj}j∈J are distinct. These three features will
be crucial to establish the contradiction. In what follows, we will use that feature (ii)
implies, for the set J , that the shortest SARP cycle has (minimal) length |J |.14
Without loss of generality, let us re-index the observations in J such that the SARP
violation is given by the cycle q1Rq2Rq3 . . . Rq|J |Rq1, i.e.
1 ≥ p1q2,
1 ≥ p2q3,
. . . ,
1 ≥ p|J |−1q|J |,
1 ≥ p|J |q1.
For a number j ≥ 1, we denote by bjc the number j mod |J |.
Given that P is a triangular configuration, we have that, for any j ≤ |J |, there must
exist a λ ∈ [0, 1] such that one of the following inequalities holds:
pbj+1c ≤ λpj + (1− λ)pbj+2c, (1)
pj ≤ λpbj+1c + (1− λ)pbj+2c, (2)
pbj+2c ≤ λpj + (1− λ)pbj+1c, (3)
pj ≥ λpbj+1c + (1− λ)pbj+2c, (4)
pbj+1c ≥ λpj + (1− λ)pbj+2c, (5)
pbj+2c ≥ λpj + (1− λ)pbj+1c. (6)
In the remainder of this sufficiency proof, we will show that none of these inequalities
can hold, which gives us the desired contradiction.
Lemma 1. (4), (5) and (6) cannot hold.
Proof. There are three similar cases to consider.
Case 1: Assume pj ≥ λpbj+1c + (1− λ)pbj+2c holds.
We first note that, if λ = 1, then we have that pj ≥ pbj+1c. Multiplying both sides by
qj gives
1 = pjqj ≥ pbj+1cqj.
Since pbj+1cqbj+1c also equals 1, this obtains the following WARP violation
qj Rqbj+1cRqj.
This is a contradiction. As such, we can assume that λ < 1. Then, multiplying both
sides of the inequality by qbj+1c gives
pjqbj+1c ≥ λpbj+1cqbj+1c + (1− λ)pbj+2cqcj+1c.
14We remark that, for |J | = 3, a SARP cycle with length smaller than |J | actually implies a WARP
violation. For compactness, we will not consider this case separately in what follows. But it is easily
verified that it is implicitly included in our further argument.
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Since pjqj(= 1) ≥ pjqbj+1c, this implies
1 ≥ λ+ (1− λ)pbj+2cqbj+1c
⇔1− λ ≥ (1− λ)pbj+2cqbj+1c
⇔1 ≥ pbj+2cqcj+1c.
This obtains again a WARP violation
qbj+1cRqbj+2cRqbj+1c.
Case 2: Assume pbj+1c ≥ λpj + (1− λ)pbj+2c holds.
We first note that, if λ = 0, then we have that pbj+1c ≥ pbj+2c. After a similar reasoning
as in Case 1 we then obtain a WARP violation by multiplying both sides by qbj+1c.
As such, we can assume that λ > 0. Then, multiplying both sides of the inequality by
qbj+2c gives
1 ≥ pbj+1cqbj+2c ≥ λpjqbj+2c + (1− λ)pbj+2cqbj+2c
⇔ 1 ≥ λpjqbj+2c + (1− λ)
⇔ 1 ≥ pjqbj+2c.
This implies that qjRqbj+2c. As such, we can remove bj + 1c from J to obtain a SARP
cycle with length smaller than |J |. But this contradicts the minimality property of the
set J .
Case 3: Assume pbj+2c ≥ λpj + (1− λ)pbj+1c holds.
We first note that, if λ = 1, then we have that pbj+2c ≥ pj. By multiplying both sides
of the inequality by qbj+2c, we obtain that we can remove bj + 1c from J , which obtains
the same case as under Case 2.
As such, we can assume that λ < 1. Multiplying both sides of the inequality by qbj+3c
gives
pbj+2cqbj+3c ≥ λpjqbj+3c + (1− λ)pbj+1cqbj+3c.
If bj+ 3c = j, then 1 ≥ pbj+2cqj ≥ λ+ (1−λ)pbj+1cqj. So, 1 ≥ pbj+1cqj which gives the
WARP cycle
qj Rqbj+1cRqj.
As such, assume that bj + 3c 6= j. Then, given that the left hand side (which is smaller
than or equal to 1) must be bigger than a convex combination of two positive numbers,
it must be bigger than at least one of them. If 1 ≥ pbj+2cqbj+3c ≥ pjqbj+3c, we can
remove bj + 1c and bj + 2c from J to obtain a SARP cycle with length smaller than |J |.
Similarly, if 1 ≥ pbj+2cqbj+3c ≥ pbj+1cqbj+3c we can remove bj + 2c from J to obtain a
SARP cycle with length smaller than |J |. In each situation, we get a contradiction with
the minimality property of J .
The following lemma considers inequalities (2) and (3).
Lemma 2. (2) and (3) cannot hold.
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Proof. There are two similar cases to consider.
Case 1: Assume pj ≤ λpbj+1c + (1− λ)pbj+2c holds.
Multiplying both sides by qbj+2c gives
pjqbj+2c ≤ λpbj+1cqbj+2c + (1− λ)pbj+2cqbj+2c.
The right hand side is a weighted average of two numbers that are less than or equal to
one, so this number is also less than or equal to one. As such,
1 ≥ pjqbj+2c.
This implies that qjRqbj+2c and we can remove bj + 1c from J to obtain a SARP cycle
with length smaller than |J |, which contradicts with the minimality property of the set
J .
Case 2: Assume pbj+2c ≤ λpj + (1− λ)pbj+1c holds.
Now, multiply both sides by qbj+1c,
pbj+2cqbj+1c ≤ λpjqbj+1c + (1− λ).
The right hand side is again a weighted average of two numbers that are smaller than or
equal to 1 so the left hand side is also smaller than or equal to 1. This gives the WARP
cycle
qbj+2cRqbj+1cRqbj+2c.
Lemmata 1 and 2 show that we can conclude that condition (1) must hold for all
j ≤ |J |. That is, for all j, there exists a λj ∈ [0, 1] such that
pbj+1c ≤ λjpj + (1− λj)pbj+2c,
or, in other words, there must exist λ1, . . . , λ|J | ∈ [0, 1] that solve the following system
of inequalities:
λ1p1 + (1− λ1)p3 ≥ p2,
λ2p2 + (1− λ2)p4 ≥ p3,
. . . ,
λ|J |−1p|J |−1 + (1− λ|J |−1)p1 ≥ p|J |,
λ|J |p|J | + (1− λ|J |)p2 ≥ p1.
We will show that this system of inequalities cannot have a solution for the λj. As a
first step, we note that none of the λj can be equal to zero or one. Specifically, if λj = 0,
then we have pbj+1c ≤ pbj+2c. Multiplying both sides by qbj+3c then gives
pbj+1cqbj+3c ≤ pbj+2cqbj+3c ≤ 1,
which implies that qbj+1cRqbj+3c so that we can remove bj + 2c from J to obtain a
subset J \{bj+2c} that satisfies WARP and violates SARP. This contradiction with the
minimality property of J shows that λj > 0. Alternatively, if λ = 1 then pbj+1c ≤ pj.
Multiplying both sides by qj then gives
pbj+1cqj ≤ pjqj = 1,
16
which implies that qj Rqbj+1cRqj, a violation of WARP.
Thus, we must have λj ∈ (0, 1) for all j = 1, ..., |J |. Now, for any good i, let us define
j such that (for (p)i representing the i-th component of p)
(pbj+1c)i = max
t∈J
(pt)i = Mi.
Then, the inequality pbj+1c ≤ λjpj + (1− λj)pbj+2c and λj ∈ (0, 1) implies
(pj)i = (pj+2)i = (pj+1)i = Mi,
because λj ∈ (0, 1). We can repeat the same reasoning for j + 1, j + 2, . . . to obtain
(pt)i = Mi for all t ∈ J.
By replicating this argument for all goods i = 1, ..,m, we get that the price vectors
pt are identical for all t ∈ J . But this makes it impossible that the set {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,|J |
violates SARP (and WARP), which gives the desired contradiction.
This finishes the sufficiency part of our proof and we can conclude that the set of
price vectors P = {pt}t=1,...,n is WARP-reducible if it is a triangular configuration.
Necessity. To show the reverse, let us consider a set of price vectors P that is not a
triangular configuration. In particular, let {p1,p2,p3} ⊆ P be a set of three distinct
price vectors such that none of the vector inequalities for the triangular configuration is
satisfied.
Our aim is to show the existence of vectors {{q1,q2,q3}} ∈ Q({p1,p2,p3}) such that
{(p1,q1), (p2,q2), (p3,q3)} violates SARP but not WARP.
To obtain the result, let us first show that there exists a vector q˜1 ∈ Rm+ and a number
M > 0 such that the following system of inequalities has a solution:
p1q˜1 = M,
p3q˜1 ≤M,
p2q˜1 > M.
By introducing the slack variables a and b, the feasibility of this system of linear
inequalities is equivalent to the existence of a vector q˜1 ≥ 0 and numbers M,a, b ≥ 0
such that the following system of linear equalities has a solution:
pT1 −1 0 0pT3 −1 1 0
pT2 −1 0 −1


q˜1
M
a
b
 =
00
1
 .
Note that in the last equation we use that the inequality was strict. As such, the
right side should contain a strictly positive number, which we can assume to be one
(since rescaling is always possible). Also, the last restriction requires q˜1 6= 0, so the first
restriction automatically guarantees that M > 0.
To show that this last system has a solution, we make use of Farkas’ Lemma. There-
fore, we need to show that there do not exist numbers α, β and γ that solve the following
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set of inequality constraints (i.e. the dual system):
αp1 + βp3 + γp2 ≥ 0,
α + β + γ ≤ 0,
β ≥ 0,
γ < 0.
Let us first assume that α > 0 (and thus α + β > 0). Then, we have
α
α + β
p1 +
β
α + β
p3 ≥ −γ
α + β
p2 ≥ p2,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that −γ
α+β
≥ 1. This implies that the
triangular condition is satisfied, which is a contradiction.
As such, we may assume that α ≤ 0 (and thus −α − γ > 0). Note that, since the
three price vectors are strictly positive, we must have that β is also strictly positive.
Then, we have
p3 ≥ β−α− γp3 ≥
−γ
−α− γp2 +
−α
−α− γp1,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that β/(−α − γ) ≤ 1. Once more this
implies that the triangular condition is satisfied.
We conclude that the dual system has no solution and, thus, Farkas’ Lemma states
that the original system does have a solution. That is, there exists a vector q˜1 ∈ Rm+ and
a number M > 0 such that
p1q˜1 = M,
p3q˜1 ≤M,
p2q˜1 > M.
Given that M > 0, we can divide both sides by M and define q1 = q˜1/M to obtain
p1q1 = 1,
p3q1 ≤ 1,
p2q1 > 1.
By simply exchanging the indices, we can repeat the above reasoning to show the
existence of q2,q3 ∈ Rm+ satisfying
p1q1 = 1, p2q2 = 1, p3q3 = 1,
1 ≥ p1q2, 1 ≥ p2q3, 1 ≥ p3q1,
1 < p1q3, 1 < p2q1, 1 < p3q2.
Thus, we obtain three distinct vectors q1,q2,q3 for which
q1Rq2Rq3Rq1,
which gives a SARP violation. Moreover, the last row of inequalities shows that there
are no WARP violations.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Necessity. Assume that P satisfies the triangular condition. We need to show the
existence of two vectors r1, r2 ∈ P such that, for all p ∈ P ,
p = αr1 + βr2,
where α, β ≥ 0 are not both zero.
Take any p ∈ P . Since p ∈ Rm++, we have that γ = 1/(
∑
i(p)i) > 0 and we can
define p˜ ≡ γp ∈ ∆ ∩ P . If P ∩ ∆ is a singleton, say r1, then we have that γp = r1,
which obtains the desired result. If P ∩ ∆ is not a singleton, then it contains at least
two vectors, say p1 and p2 and there exists a j ≤ m such that the vectors are not equal
in the j-th component (i.e. (p1)j 6= (p2)j). Let
r1 ∈ arg min
p∈∆∩P
(p)j and r2 ∈ arg max
p∈∆∩P
(p)j.
r1 is the vector in ∆ ∩ P whose component (r)j is minimal. Likewise, r2 is the vector in
∆ ∩ P whose component (r2)j is maximal.
The compactness of ∆ ∩ P (i.e. ∆ is bounded and ∆ ∩ P is closed by assumption)
assures that r1 and r2 are well defined. Furthermore, by definition we have
(r1)j ≤ (p˜)j ≤ (r2)j and (r1)j < (r2)j.
Since p˜, r1 and r2 belong to P , we know that the triangular condition holds. Moreover,
the inequality is actually an equality since p˜, r1 and r2 belong to the simplex ∆. Indeed,
suppose that there exists λ ∈ [0, 1] : p ≤ λr1 + (1 − λ)r2. If this inequality would be
strict, then we obtain the following contradiction:
1 =
m∑
i=1
(p˜)i < λ
m∑
i=1
(r1)i + (1− λ)
m∑
i=1
(r2)i = 1.
Obviously, a similar reasoning holds for the other inequalities captured by the trian-
gular condition.
This shows that the triangular condition implies that there exists a λ ∈ [0, 1] such
that one of the following three conditions hold:
p˜ = λr1 + (1− λ)r2,
r1 = λp˜ + (1− λ)r2,
r2 = λp˜ + (1− λ)r1.
Note that, if λ = 0 or λ = 1, these conditions imply that either p˜ = r1, p˜ = r2 or
r1 = r2. The latter contradicts with the definition of r1 and r2, while in the first two
cases we obtain what we needed to prove.
Let us then show that the last two conditions can never hold if 0 < λ < 1. Assume
that r1 = λp˜ + (1− λ)r2 holds. Then, (r1)j ≤ (p˜)j implies
λ(p˜)j + (1− λ)(r2)j ≤ (p˜)j.
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This implies that (r2)j ≤ (p˜)j ≤ (r2)j or equivalently, (p˜)j = (r2)j. Then,
(r1)j = λ(p˜)j + (1− λ)(r2)j = (r2)j,
This contradicts with the definition of r1 and r2. A similar reasoning holds for the
last condition.
We conclude that p˜ = λr1 + (1− λ)r2 and, thus,
p =
λ
γ
r1 +
1− λ
γ
r2.
Both coefficients λ/γ and (1− λ)/γ are positive and at least one is different from zero.
Sufficiency. Take any three vector p1,p2,p3 and assume that
p1 = α1r1 + β1r2,
p2 = α2r1 + β2r2,
p3 = α3r1 + β3r2.
We need to show that the triangular condition is satisfied. Assume that (αi, βi >
0, i = 1, 2, 3). If one or more of these coefficients are zero, the reasoning is similar but
the equations have to be somewhat adjusted. From the first two equations it follows that
α2p1 − α1p2 = (β1α2 − β2α1) r2,
β2p1 − β1p2 = (β2α1 − β1α2) r1.
If β1α2 = β2α1, then p1 is proportional to p2 and thus the triangular condition is
satisfied. Else, we obtain
α2p1 − α1p2
β1α2 − β2α1 = r2,
and, similarly,
β1p2 − β2p1
β1α2 − β2α1 = r1.
Substituting this last equation in the third equation above gives
p3 = α3
(
β1p2 − β2p1
β1α2 − β2α1
)
+ β3
(
α2p1 − α1p2
β1α2 − β2α1
)
⇔(β1α2 − β2α1)p3 = (α3β1 − β3α1)p2 + (β3α2 − α3β2)p1.
Using αi, βi > 0 (i = 1, 2, 3), we can exclude that the inequalities β2α1 > β1α2,
β1α3 > β3α1 and β3α2 > β2α3 hold simultaneously (multiplying all left hand sides
and right hand sides together gives, 1 > 1), and that the inequalities β2α1 < β1α2,
β1α3 < β3α1 and β3α2 < β2α3 hold simultaneously. Therefore, we can always rearrange
the above equality such that all the coefficients are positive. Therefore, without loss of
generality, we can assume that there exist γ1, γ2, γ3 ≥ 0 (and 2 of the three distinct from
zero) such that
γ3p3 + γ2p2 = γ1p1.
If we divide by (γ3 + γ2), we get
γ3
γ3 + γ2
p3 +
γ2
γ3 + γ2
p2 =
γ1
γ3 + γ2
p1.
If γ1/(γ3 + γ2) ≥ 1, then p1 is smaller than some convex combination of p2 and p3.
Else, p1 is bigger than some convex combination of p2 and p3.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
The following proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2, but more care should be taken
with strict versus weak inequalities and with the exact position of the strict revealed
preference relation in the GARP cycle.
Sufficiency. Consider a set of normalized price vectors P = {pt}t=1,...,n that is a trian-
gular configuration. Assume, by contradiction, that P is not WGARP reducible. This
means that there exists a set of quantity vectors {qt}t=1,...,n ∈ Q, with qt  0 for all t,
and a subset of {(pt,qt)}t=1,...,n such that GARP is violated but WGARP is satisfied.
Let {(pt,qt)}t∈J (J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}) be such a subset that is minimal with respect to
set inclusion (such set exists by the fact that n is finite). Although J is not necessarily
unique, this minimality property implies that (i) {(pt,qt)}t∈J cannot have a smaller
subset that also violates GARP, (ii) all elements in {(pt,qt)}t∈J must be involved in
the GARP cycle and (iii) all vectors in {qj}j∈J are distinct. These three features will
be crucial to establish the contradiction. In what follows, we will use that feature (ii)
implies, for the set J , that the shortest GARP cycle has (minimal) length |J |.15
Without loss of generality, let us re-index the observations in J such that the GARP
violation is given by the cycle q1 PR q2Rq3 . . . Rq|J |Rq1, i.e.
1 > p1q2,
1 ≥ p2q3,
. . . ,
1 ≥ p|J |−1q|J |,
1 ≥ p|J |q1.
For a number j ≥ 1, let us again denote bjc for (j mod |J |).
Now, consider all three element subsets {pj,pbj+1c,pbj+2c} for j ≤ |J |. Given that P
is a triangular configuration, we have that, for all j, there is a λ ∈ [0, 1] such that one of
the following inequalities holds:
pbj+1c ≤ λpj + (1− λ)pbj+2c, (7)
pj ≤ λpbj+1c + (1− λ)pbj+2c, (8)
pbj+2c ≤ λpj + (1− λ)pbj+1c, (9)
pj ≥ λpbj+1c + (1− λ)pbj+2c, (10)
pbj+1c ≥ λpj + (1− λ)pbj+2c, (11)
pbj+2c ≥ λpj + (1− λ)pbj+1c. (12)
Below, we give 6 lemmata. In Lemma 1 we show that (7) cannot hold for λ ∈ {0, 1}.
In Lemmata 2-6, we show that (8)-(12) cannot hold. From these results, it follows that,
for all j, there must exist a number λj ∈ (0, 1) such that
pbj+1c ≤ λjpj + (1− λj)pbj+2c.
15We remark that, for |J | = 3, a GARP cycle with length smaller than |J | actually implies a WGARP
violation. For compactness, we will not consider this case separately in what follows. But it is easily
verified that it is implicitly included in our further argument.
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In the proof of Proposition 2 we already showed that this system of inequalities has a
solution only if all prices pj, j = 1, . . . |J | are identical. However, this shows that the
inequalities also hold for λ1 = . . . = λ|J | = 1, which gives the desired contradiction and
demonstrates the sufficiency part of Proposition 5.
Lemma 1 If (7) holds, then λ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. We will only consider the case λ = 1, since the proof for λ = 0 is readily analogous.
Assume, by contradiction, that λ = 1. Then,
pj ≥ pbj+1c.
There are three cases to consider. Either p1 = pj (i.e. 1 = j) or p1 = pbj+1c (i.e.
1 = bj + 1c) or p1 /∈ {pj,pbj+1c} (i.e. 1 6= j, bj + 1c ).
Case 1: 1 = j. Then, we have
p1 ≥ p2.
This gives 1 > p1q2 ≥ p2q2 = 1, a contradiction.
Case 2: 1 = bj + 1c. Then, we have
p|J | ≥ p1.
If p|J | = p1, then p|J |q2 = p1q2 < 1, so we obtain q|J | PR q2. This gives us a shorter
GARP cycle (with length smaller than |J |), which contradicts minimality of set J . If
p|J | > p1, then 1 ≥ p|J |q1 > p1q1 = 1, a contradiction.
Case 3. 1 6= j, bj + 1c. Then,
pj ≥ pbj+1c.
If pj = pbj+1c, then pjqbj+2c = pbj+1cqbj+2c ≤ 1. Thus, qj Rqbj+2c, which shows that
there exists a shorter GARP cycle (with length smaller than |J |). We conclude that
pj > pbj+1c, but then 1 ≥ pjqbj+1c > pbj+1cqbj+1c = 1, a contradiction.
Lemma 2 Condition (8) does not hold.
Proof. Assume that
pj ≤ λpbj+1c + (1− λ)pbj+2c.
Note that, if λ = 0, we obtain
pbj+2c ≥ pj.
There are four cases to consider. Either p1 = pj (i.e. 1 = j), p1 = pbj+1c (i.e. 1 = bj+1c),
p1 = pbj+2c (i.e. 1 = bj + 2c) or p1 /∈ {pj,pbj+1c,pbj+2c} (i.e. 1 6=, j, bj + 1c, bj + 2c).
Case 1: 1 = j. Then,
p3 ≥ p1.
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If p3 = p1, then p3q2 = p1q2 < 1, which means that we get a WGARP violation
q2Rq3 PR q2. If p3 > p1, then 1 = p3q3 > p1q3. So q1 PR q3 and we obtain a shorter
GARP cycle (with length smaller than |J |).
Case 2: 1 = bj + 1c. Then,
p2 ≥ p|J |.
If p2 = p|J |, then p2q1 = p|J |q1 ≤ 1 so we obtain the WGARP violation q1 PR q2Rq1.
If p2 > p|J |, then 1 = p2q2 > p|J |q2 so we obtain that q|J | PR q2, which gives a shorter
GARP cycle (with length smaller than |J |).
Case 3: 1 = bj + 2c. Then,
p1 ≥ p|J |−1.
This implies 1 = p1q1 ≥ p|J |−1q1, so q|J |−1Rq1 and we obtain a shorter GARP cycle
(with length smaller than |J |).
Case 4: 1 6= j, bj + 1c, bj + 2c. Then,
1 ≥ pbj+2cqbj+2b ≥ pjqbj+2c.
This implies that we get a shorter GARP cycle (with length smaller than |J |), since
qjRqbj+2c.
If λ = 1 we obtain that pbj+1c ≥ pj, and this complies with the case λ = 0 of Lemma
1.
Thus, we conclude that there must be a λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
pj ≤ λpbj+1c + (1− λ)pbj+2c.
Again, we need to consider four cases: p1 = pj (i.e. 1 = j), p1 = pbj+1c (i.e. 1 = bj+1c),
p1 = pbj+2c (i.e. 1 = bj + 2c) and p1 /∈ {pj,pbj+1c,pbj+2c} (i.e. 1 6=, j, bj + 1c, bj + 2c).
Case 1: 1 = j. This gives
p1 ≤ λp2 + (1− λ)p3.
If λp2 + (1 − λ)p3 = p1, then λ + (1 − λ)p3q2 = p1q2 < 1. This shows that 1 > p3q2,
so we get the WGARP violation q2Rq3 PR q2. If λp2 + (1− λ)p3 > p1, then
1 ≥ λp2q3 + (1− λ) > p1q3,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that the rights hand side is a convex
combination of two numbers smaller than or equal to one. This shows that q1 PR q3, so
that we obtain a shorter GARP cycle (with length smaller than |J |).
Case 2: 1 = bj + 1c. This gives
p|J | ≤ λp1 + (1− λ)p2
Then, as before, we obtain
1 > λp1q2 + (1− λ) ≥ p|J |q2,
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which shows that q|J | PR q2. This gives a shorter GARP cycle (with length smaller than
|J |).
Case 3: 1 = bj + 2c. This gives
p|J |−1 ≤ λp|J | + (1− λ)p1.
Then,
1 ≥ λp|J |q1 + (1− λ) ≥ p|J |−1q1,
which shows that q|J |−1Rq1. So we obtain a shorter GARP cycle (with length smaller
than |J |).
Case 4: 1 6= j, bj + 1c, bj + 2c. Then,
1 ≥ λpbj+1cqbj+2c + (1− λ) ≥ pjqbj+2c,
which means that qj Rqbj+2c. So we again obtain a shorter GARP cycle (with length
smaller than |J |).
Lemma 3 Condition (9) cannot hold.
Proof. We omit this proof since it is readily analogous to the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 4 Condition (10) cannot hold.
Proof. First note that we only need to consider the strict inequality, since Lemma 2
shows that the equality cannot hold. Towards a contradiction, assume that
pj > λpbj+1c + (1− λ)pbj+2c.
If λ = 1, then pj > pbj+1c. This was shown to lead to a violation in the proof of Lemma
1. If λ = 0, then pj > pbj+2c. This was shown to lead to a violation in the proof of
Lemma 3. As such, the above inequality should hold with λ ∈ (0, 1). Then,
1 ≥ pjqbj+1c > λ+ (1− λ)pbj+2cqbj+1c.
This implies 1 > pbj+2cqbj+1c and gives the WGARP violation qbj+1cRqbj+2c PR qbj+1c.
Lemma 5 Condition (11) does not hold.
Proof. We omit this proof since it is readily analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.
Lemma 6 Condition (12) does not hold.
Proof. We omit this proof since it is readily analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.
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Necessity. Let us consider a set of prices P that is not a triangular configuration. In
particular, let {p1,p2,p3} ⊆ P be a set of three distinct price vectors such that none of
the vector inequalities for the triangular configuration are satisfied.
Our aim is to show the existence of vectors {{q1,q2,q3}} ∈ Q({p1,p2,p3}), with
q1,q2,q3  0, such that {(p1,q1), (p2,q2), (p3,q3)} violates GARP but not WGARP.
To obtain the result, let us first show that there exists a vector q˜1 ∈ Rm++ and a
number M > 0 such that the following system of inequalities has a solution:
p1q˜1 = M,
p3q˜1 < M,
p2q˜1 > M.
By rescaling, the feasibility of this system is equivalent to the existence of a vector
q˜1 ≥ 0, a vector w ≥ 0 and numbers M,a, b ≥ 0 such that the following system has a
solution: 
pT1 −1 0 0 0
pT3 −1 1 0 0
pT2 −1 0 −1 0
I 0 0 0 −I


q˜1
M
a
b
w
 =

0
−1
1
1
 ,
where I is the m dimensional unit matrix and 1 is the m-dimensional vector of ones.
We prove feasibility of the system by contradiction. If the system is not feasible, then
by Farkas’ Lemma (Theorem of the Alternative) there must exist numbers α, γ, β and µi
(i ≤ m) such that the following set of inequalities is feasible:
αp1 + γp3 + βp2 + Iµ ≥ 0,
α + γ + β ≤ 0,
γ ≥ 0,
β ≤ 0,
µi ≤ 0,
− γ + β +
∑
i
µi < 0.
Let us first show that either γ or α is strictly positive. If not, then γ = 0 so the last
condition tells us that β +
∑
i µi < 0. If β < 0, then, if we add up the first condition
over all goods m and set γ = 0, we get
α
∑
i
(p1)i ≥ −β
∑
i
(p2)i −
∑
i
µi ≥ −β
∑
i
(p2)i > 0,
which shows that α > 0, a contradiction. If β = 0, then
∑
i µi < 0, and we get
α
∑
i
(p1)i ≥ −
∑
i
µi > 0,
which gives again the contradiction α > 0.
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Next, observe that the first and fifth condition together imply
αp1 + γp3 + βp2 ≥ 0.
Given that either α > 0 or γ > 0, we can distinguish three cases:
Case 1: γ > 0, α ≥ 0, β ≤ 0. Then,
α
α + γ
p1 +
γ
α + γ
p3 ≥ −β
α + γ
p2 ≥ p2,
which shows that the triangular condition holds. This is a contradiction.
Case 2: γ > 0, α < 0, β ≤ 0. Then,
p3 ≥ γ−α− βp3 ≥
−α
−α− βp1 +
−β
−α− βp2,
which again shows that the triangular condition holds.
Case 3: γ = 0, α > 0, β ≤ 0. Then,
p1 ≥ −β
α
p2 ≥ p2,
Once again, the triangular condition is satisfied.
In all cases, we conclude that the triangular condition should be satisfied. We can
therefore conclude that the dual system has no solution, which means that the original
system does have a solution, i.e. there is a vector q˜1  0 and a number M > 0 such
that
p1q˜1 = M,
p3q˜1 < M,
p2q˜1 > M.
Given that M > 0, we can divide both sides by M and define q1 = q˜1/M  0, which
obtains
p1q1 = 1,
p3q1 < 1,
p2q1 > 1.
By simply exchanging the indices, we can repeat the above reasoning to show the
existence of q2,q3 ∈ Rm++ that satisfy
p1q1 = 1, p2q2 = 1, p3q3 = 1,
1 > p1q2, 1 > p2q3, 1 > p3q1,
1 < p1q3, 1 < p2q1, 1 < p3q2.
Thus, we obtain three distinct vectors q1,q2 and q3 for which
q1 PR q2 PR q3 PR q1.
That is, {(p1,q1), (p2,q2), (p3,q3)} violates GARP. Moreover, the last row of in-
equalities shows that there are no WGARP violations.
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B Bounding the length of SARP cycles
Our following example obtains the general conclusion that, for a set of n price vectors
that is WARP-reducible, it is possible to add a (n + 1)-th price vector that obtains a
SARP cycle of any length. As a preliminary note, we remark that our set of prices and
quantities may seem somewhat artificial. We emphasize that this is mainly for mathe-
matical convenience and not crucial for the core of our argument. It is possible to perturb
the prices and quantities to make them “more realistic”. However, this would complicate
the computations and, more importantly, it would make the argument substantially less
transparent.
Step 1. We start by defining a set of n normalized price vectors (p1, ...,pn) that is a
triangular consideration and, therefore, WARP-reducible. In particular, we consider the
following set of normalized price vectors:
p1 =
(
1
3
,
2
3
, 1
)
,
p2 =
(
1
5
,
6
5
, 1
)
,
. . . ,
pt =
(
1
2t+ 1
,
t(t+ 1)
2t+ 1
, 1
)
,
. . . ,
pn =
(
1
2n+ 1
,
n(n+ 1)
2n+ 1
, 1
)
.
Since the price of the third good equals unity for all t = 1, ..., n, these prices form a
triangular configuration if the triangular inequalities hold for the price vectors restricted
to the first two goods. However, form Section 3 we know that in a two-goods setting,
the triangular inequality is always satisfied by construction. Therefore, we can conclude
that this set of normalized prices is a triangular configuration.
Step 2. For the given set of n normalized price vectors, we next construct a correspond-
ing set of n quantity vectors (q1, ...,qn) and, for the resulting dataset {pt,qt}t=1,...,n, we
characterize the revealed preference relations. Specifically, we consider the following set
of quantities:
q1 = (1, 1, 0),
q2 = (2, 1/2, 0),
q3 = (3, 1/3, 0),
. . .
qt = (t, 1/t, 0),
. . .
qn = (n, 1/n, 0).
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Observe that total expenditure in each observation t is equal to unity, as required for
our definition of normalized prices. Specifically,
ptqt =
1
2t+ 1
t+
t(t+ 1)
2t+ 1
1
t
=
2t+ 1
2t+ 1
= 1.
Next, for any s and t we have
ptqs =
1
2t+ 1
s+
t(t+ 1)
2t+ 1
1
s
.
From this we can derive that qtRqt+1, while there are no other direct revealed prefer-
ence relations between any two different t and s (i.e. we have ptqs > 1 for any s 6= t, t+1).
To see this last result, we first note that the above product ptqs is a strictly convex
function in s. The minimum of this function is reached when
1
2t+ 1
=
t(t+ 1)
2t+ 1
1
s2
⇔s2 = t(t+ 1)
⇒s =
√
t(t+ 1),
which gives a number between t and t + 1. Thus, for integer s, the minimal values are
obtained for the values s = t and s = t + 1. For s = t, we simply have ptqt = 1, as
verified above. For s = t+ 1, we obtain
ptqt+1 =
1
2t+ 1
(t+ 1) +
t(t+ 1)
2t+ 1
1
t+ 1
=
t+ 1 + t
2t+ 1
= 1.
From this we can conclude qtRqt+1. Moreover, because the convex function ptqs
reaches a minimum at t and t + 1, we also have that ptqs > 1 for any s 6= t, t + 1. As
such we obtain consistency with WARP and SARP.
Step 3. We now add a (n+1)-th price vector p0 and a corresponding (n+1)-th quantity
vector q0 that obtains a SARP cycle of length n+1 for the dataset {pt,qt}t=0,...,n, without
there being any smaller SARP cycle. In particular, we consider the (n+1)-th price vector
p0 = (2/3, 1/3, 1/2),
and the (n+ 1)-th quantity vector
q0 =
(
6n+ 3
8n+ 1
, 0,
8n− 2
8n+ 1
)
.
We obtain our result in 5 steps:
1. As required, p0q0 = 1:
p0q0 =
2
3
6n+ 3
8n+ 1
+
1
2
8n− 2
8n+ 1
=
4n+ 2 + 4n− 1
8n+ 1
= 1.
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2. We have a first extra revealed preference relation qnRq0 (i.e. 1 ≥ pnq0):
pnq0 =
1
2n+ 1
6n+ 3
8n+ 1
+
8n− 2
8n+ 1
=
3 + 8n− 2
8n+ 1
= 1.
3. There is also a second extra revealed preference relation q0Rq1 (i.e. 1 ≥ p0q1):
p0q1 =
2
3
+
1
3
= 1.
All this obtains the SARP violation q0Rq1Rq2R . . . RqnRq0.
4. The bundle q0 is not directly revealed preferred to any bundle qs, with s 6= 0, 1
(i.e. p0qs > 1 for all s = 2, . . . , n):
p0qs =
2
3
s+
1
3
1
s
,
where the right hand side is strictly increasing in s for all s > 1 and is equal to
unity for s = 1.
5. Finally, no quantity bundle qs, with s 6= 0, n, is directly revealed preferred to the
bundle q0 (i.e. psq0 > 1 for all s = 1, . . . , n− 1). We prove this by contradiction.
Specifically, assume
1 ≥ psq0 = 1
2s+ 1
6n+ 3
8n+ 1
+
8n− 2
8n+ 1
⇔1 ≥ 1
8n+ 1
(
1
2s+ 1
(6n+ 3) + 8n− 2
)
⇔3 ≥ 6n+ 3
2s+ 1
⇔2s+ 1 ≥ 2n+ 1
⇔s ≥ n,
which gives a contradiction. These last two steps show that there does not exist a
shorter SARP cycle. In particular, the dataset {pt,qt}t=0,...,n satisfies WARP but
not SARP.
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